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138 Arnold Farr 
Critical Theory and Recovering Ethical Life are two very remarkable books. 
These books are written for an academic audience whose interests lie in the present 
status of theory and rationality whether in philosophy or the social sciences in gen-
eral. The authors of both books have shown extreme sensitivity in their examination 
of the way in which the debate has unfolded and also to the intricate details in the 
arguments of those involved in the debate. While neither book offers a complete 
and satisfactory answer to questions about the status of reason in contemporary 
theoretical discoures, they do elucidate quite well the problems with traditional 
conceptions of reason and the way in which these conceptions have been responded 
to. The authors have at least made more visible the many tensions involved in any 
discussion of rational discourse, such as the problematic relationship between inter-
pretation and validity claims, and have presented to us the more salient possibilities 
for the continuation of rational discourses. Through my own reading of these texts I 
have been forced to think about rationality from a variety of perspectives. Each 
book represents an important moment in contemporary debates on rationality and 
stands as an invitation to all who are interested in and are willing to participate in 
the debate. 
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Cultural Theory and Intellectual Politics 
An Interview with Russell Berman 
Department of German Studies, Stanford University 
Conducted by Jennifer Kopf, Credmon Staddon 
disClosure Editorial Collective 
Lexington, Kentucky 
Saturday, February 11, 1995 
This interview with the German Studies and Cultural Theory scholar Russell 
Berman took place in the context of his invited lecture to the Interdisciplinary 
Committee on Social Theory's Spring Lecture Series at the University of Kentucky. 
That lecture, entitled "Imperialism and Enlightenment," discussed the relations be-
tween philosophical models of enlightenment and the Western colonial project. The 
interview picks up on this general theme, but brings it into such contemporary con-
texts as German unification and the economic collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Also 
discussed are the epistemological and political statuses of Cultural Studies, which 
Berman sees as deeply problematic. Throughout the discussion Berman is con-
cerned also to raise the idea that cultural authenticity cannot be restricted to the old 
centre I margin dichotomy, which he partially deconstructs. The interview con-
cludes with some discussion of the points of convergence between German Critical 
Theory and French Poststructuralism. 
Culture, Nation, Identity and Contemporary Cultural Studies 
disClosure: When you are talking about imperialism and enlightenment in your 
book Cultural Studies of Modern Germany: History, Representation and Nation-
hood, you often refer back to the connections between "culture," "nation" and 
"identity"; for example, when you are talking about the Gulf War, you refer back to 
"culture-nation-identity" as a kind of explanatory triad. We thought that the dis-
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cussion of this foundational principle could provide the basis for this interview. To 
quote from the introductory chapter of your book 
"not because of any essential identification of culture and nation but 
becau.se for cultural studies the nation is one particularly intriguin~ site 
at which symbolic orders are distinguished." 
Contrarily, others have argued that the notion of "culture", deriving from the 
German "Kultur," is absolutely identified with immanent nineteenth century Ger-
man nationhood, with German modernity. So, I would like to challenge you a bit 
on the status of this relation. Connected to this, I would also like to discuss with 
you the question of the rise and epistemological status of contemporary Cultural 
Studies. 
Berman: In my work and in that book in particular I am trying to comment on 
both Germany and some German questions as well as to raise constantly some theo-
retical questions about Cultural Studies. I think that Cultural Studies in its empiri-
cal and theoretical formulations in contemporary American universities has great 
potential. I also think however that there is considerable confusion, both among the 
advocates of Cultural Studies and its opponents, as to what Cultural Studies is. The 
suggestion that one hears repeated ad nauseum in the defense of Cultural Studies is 
that it is inter-disciplinary, or meta-disciplinary, or that it draws on various tradi-
tions. The only way one can respond to that is to say "well I am glad to hear that it 
is not closed-minded, that it is prepared to draw on different traditions." Frankly I 
think that many scholars are not closed-minded and are prepared to draw on differ-
ent traditions, even if they are not part of Cultural Studies. Therefore there is a kind 
of a straw man being set up in the insistent claim by the advocates of Cultural Stud-
ies that IT is interdisciplinary and open, and by implication that everybody else is 
closed, befogged, antiquarian. Which is not to say that there are not some closed, 
befogged, antiquarian academics in universities. 
But the point of this whole prelude is to suggest that I think that the study of 
culture needs to reflect on its disciplinary nature and on its scholarly 
(wissenschaft/iche) foundations. I guess the question would be: if Cultural Studies 
is just a collection of contingent practices, what justification does it have as scholar-
ship; is it in any way different epistemologically from the material that it purports to 
study? Or is academics just another culture, a set of discursive practices, making 
reference to another culture: Germany, American popular culture, China? But then 
there is really no justification for Cultural Studies claiming a location in that special 
institution, the University, in which statements ought to be generated that have the 
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very special status of knowledge. So all of that is by way of a challenge to Cultural 
Studies to think through whether it is happy whining that it is interdisciplinary or if 
it might not try instead to overcome the misery of interdisciplinarity, and define a 
scientific agenda. Can one imagine a science of Cultural Studies? 
Now Cultural Studies, as I observe it, is interested in examining the constitution 
of collective identities through symbolic orders. That constitution including mo-
ments of resistance and the collective identification is crucial but not surprising; 
remember that identities are always contested, that there are always different voices 
within a culture ... 
Now you've challenged me also on the loose connection between "culture and 
"nation." I think that the "Nation" and national identity are very neuralgic sites of 
culture for various reasons, and I am not quite sure that I can attempt to enumerate 
them. But that is surely not the only way to imagine culture. One can certainly talk 
about sub-cultures, which are cultures, but they refer to fields smaller than the na-
tion. These might be regional cultures: there is a Southern identity, there is also a 
New England identity. Or one might talk about culture in terms of ethnic group-
ings; there may an African American culture, or there may be several, just as there 
may be an Italian-American culture. It might be the case that one can talk about 
other groups that are smaller than nations, or that transcend nations, (e.g. diasporic 
forms) which Cultural Studies could examine. In my book I am concerned with 
Germany and a key feature of Germany is the construction of nation. 
It could be, however (and this would be a third way of thinking about culture 
after "nation," and "other groupings" which are generally imaginable as smaller than 
the nation) that there is another way to think about culture, and that is culture as 
universal. Are there universal characteristics of culture that Cultural Studies might 
consider examining? Now this of course is a scandalous suggestion in the contem-
porary intellectual atmosphere, but I mean it very seriously. Because to the extent 
that one surrenders the possibility of making any kind of universalist inquiry a cer-
tain political debilitation ensues. But that is not the truly intellectual argument It 
might be the case that if one gives up the possibility of making universalist claims, 
then the scientific status of Cultural Studies becomes untenable. For then it be- 1 
comes just a matter of "this is true for me, but it is not true for you" in which case it 
is not scholarship because it cannot be falsified. What would a universalist concep-
tion of culture mean? Fifty years ago it probably would have been secularized Prot-
estantism imagined as the global set of values for individuals, faiths and character ... 
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I would think that Cultural Studies as an emerging discipline makes the initial 
assumption that humans engaged in communities construct values and identities 
through symbolic representations and that this is an existential feature of humans. 
While it is probably the case that there are no values, particularly positive values, 
that one can prove have universal necessity and there may be none that one can 
detennine as having empirical universality, clearly Cultural Studies is making the 
claim-the very exciting claim-that humans form their symbolic worlds and that 
this is a feature of humanity in general. Now if one follows Cultural Studies down 
this route - that humans make their symbolic worlds - then there may be some 
definite claims that follow on that about the relations between individuals and 
community, about past and present, that are the parameters within which any par-
ticular kind of culture gets played out. 
disClosure: Well, what about that aspect of Cultural Studies that seems to be 
just as strong as the focus on the intersubjective construction of symbolic worlds? 
This is the political aspect, the sense that, yes Cultural Studies is all the things that 
you say it is, but it is also foundationally counter-hegemonic. That what Spivak and 
others are very much concerned with is, as she puts it, figuring ways in which the 
"subaltern" can speak and speak specifically against hegemonic ways of defining 
who ''they" are, and for that matter who "we" are. I think that only at one point, 
when you mentioned resistances as a component of collective identity formation, 
did you begin to point towards that important defining feature of Cultural Studies. 
Berman: I guess I have a complex relationship to that kind of insistence on the 
counter-hegemonic character of Cultural Studies. I think that the discussion around 
Cultural Studies is prematurely and naively politicized when its proponents present 
it as left-identified and its opponents denounce it as left-identified. I would think 
that one could certainly study culture, that is to say engage in Cultural Studies and 
come up with conservative results. Those conservative results might well be in 
many circumstances as counter-hegemonic or even more counter-hegemonic than 
some of the left results. But aside from that polemic, I would want to say that cul-
ture, which is the object of Cultural Studies, has the capacity to be itself counter-
hegemonic so I would want to think about the difference between culture (I hesitate 
to say "authentic" culture) and hegemony. Of course I can think of many examples 
where culture can be hegemonic and complicitous. But I think that the reflection on 
the capacity of humans to construct their symbolic worlds is by definition counter-
hegemonic. As counter-hegemonic it could however just as well be conservative as 
progressive: when progressives own the state, conservatives may be oppositional. 
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disClosure: That prompts me to wonder if you would agree with the proposi-
tion that current right wing discourses in US politics, about the "culture of poverty'' 
and the kinds of politics (to my mind regressive) implied by that perspective, are 
therefore in some sense structurally equivalent to progressive discourses about the 
"Indian subaltern" or other marginalised groups. 
Berman: I suggested a moment ago a project for Cultural Studies and its possi-
ble "growing up." There are, however, clearly limits to Cultural Studies or possible 
pitfalls around Cultural Studies. I think Cultural Studies, to the extent that one of 
its moves is to go beyond literature and look at all sorts of objects and see them as 
parts of discourses and paradigms and orders of meaning in which we participate 
and which they inherit and try to transform, participates in what I call a "semiotic 
optimism" that everything has meaning. Pace Spivak, that is a kind of "humanism 
gone wild" because here humans are always creative of meaning and always living 
in structures of meaning. Cultural Studies ends up being incapable of articulating 
the encounter with the absolutely alienated, the absurd, brute force, which is surely 
not only a semiotic event. AND this culturalism of Cultural Studies, comparable to 
the economism of orthodox Marxism, flattens out our world, making it just a place 
where humans have meaning. Lord, growing up in the twentieth century, it is not 
only meaning you encounter ... 
disClosure: .. .it's markets, it's brute force, it's the Mexican economic crisis .... 
Berman: ... and it's meaninglessness. 
Another dimension that is arguably beyond Cultural Studies just like the mo-
ment of alien meaninglessness is the moment of absolute luminosity. Religion, 
religious experience which taken seriously (and one of the good sides of Cultural 
Studies is the imperative to take the Other seriously) is to some extent genuinely 
beyond culture; it is Divine intervention, it is not humanly created. One has to en-
tertain that possibility as-at least-an intellectual option, and imagine the mystic 
moment as non-cultural. Anthropologists often flatten religion out into a positivist 
collection of features and rituals, and that is surely part of it and accessible to Cul-
tural Studies. But I think that the genuine numinousness might be beyond Cultural 
Studies as is the absence of meaning altogether. 
In contrast to the culturalism of Cultural Studies, with its semiotic optimism, 
critical theory, the Frankfurt School, is heir to the genuine EnJightenment tradition 
of absolute skepticism, calling every putative meaning into question, subjecting it 
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all to an ideological criticism, and imagining every collective identity as manipu-
lated and authoritarian. The only collective identities that the genuine Frankfurt 
School allows is the totalitarian mob and the movie fans. Now Cultural Studies 
would say, "Oh no that is all meaningful and we have to figure out what it is all 
about" whereas Critical Theory would say "Hell, that's meaningful; that is manipu-
lation and enforced stupidity by the culture industry.,' 
Now to come back to "the culture of poverty": the danger of Cultural Studies 
and its culturalism is to buy into a notion of a "culture of poverty": the poor are just 
like any other possible collective group with its own culture and one lives this way 
in the slums with these sorts of rites, meanings and symbols, and one lives this way 
in the suburbs with these sorts of rites, symbols and meanings and Cultural Studies 
can examine them both with anthropological equanimity and is ultimately incapable 
of making a distinction because it is unwilling to address the level either of mean-
ingless or brute force. Following this path Cultural Studies ultimately ends up in a 
right Hegelian position of justifying the "culture of poverty" as just another culture 
disClosure: One about which we have no basis for judgment.. .. 
Berman: Sure, because we have denied the existence of universals and norms. 
So this is why culturalism can become conformism, since with the assumption that 
everything is meaningful it will inevitably end up claiming that the real is rational, 
which is right wing Hegelianism. 
Regionalisms, Human Rights and the Bases for Moral Judgement 
disClosure: Your position on conflict between regionalisms and universalisms 
leads me to ask if regionalism is always conservative. In a recent talk you gave at 
the University of Kentucky I got the sense that the regionalists, the people who want 
to pay attention to localities, somehow always end up politically conservative. You 
asked "Can normative democracy have a specific character?" And also "How can 
we talk about human rights in China?" So I'm trying to think through the relations 
between the region and conservatism. 
Berman: The way you talk about human rights in China is by insisting that be-
ing human entails some inalienable rights, which is akin to the Enlightenment decla-
ration of independence in thought. I remember during the Vietnam era, in response 
to some of the self immolations of Buddhist monks protesting American interven-
tion, General Westmoreland said that the American public should not be concerned 
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about this because Asians have a different relationship to death. Now that is cul-
tural relativism writ large, and I think that Cultural Studies has to figure out a way 
to distinguish itself epistemologically from General Westmoreland. Clearly Cultural 
Studies is at pains to distinguish itself politically and empirically, wrapping itself in 
the red flag as it were, saying "Oh we have nothing to do with Westmoreland." But 
in fact this is the same epistemological terrain; it has no grounds to talk about hu-
man rights in China, because the only way to do so is to try to imagine some kind of 
universalist capacity. Now that universalist capacity does not have to be as positive 
as "Everyone has access to salvation through Christ," but must be open to an em-
phatic critique of the question "what is human"? If one denounces that discourse as 
an expression of "western imperialism" then there are no grounds for that criticism. 
But of course if there are no grounds for the critique of human rights in China, then 
there are probably no grounds for critique of Apartheid in South Africa, also another 
culture. And if there is no grounds for critique of Apartheid in South Africa, then 
are probably no grounds for Americans to talk about British police actions in North-
ern Ireland. And if there are no grounds for Americans to talk of British police 
actions in Northern Ireland, there are probably no grounds for... ad infinitum. 
Every critique becomes a matter of outside intervention which is denounced from 
the standpoint of Cultural Studies' "semiotic optimism." 
disClosure: So on what can we ground universalist claims, or claims to some 
value? 
Berman: Well, I suggested one before: the capacity for culture itself. That 
does not necessarily lead to any particular conclusion. It is probably somewhat 
more conservative than the UN Declaration on Human Rights which has a sort of 
Jacobin clarity to it. But the human capacity to create meaningful worlds could be 
read in both an individual sense, drawing on the young Marx's belief that every 
human can be free, creative and active, and therefore structures that deny this free-
dom might be subject to sanction. Or it could be read in a communitarian way, for 
culture is also a shared collective undertaking. That is why I say Cultural Studies 
would not necessarily lead to a particular judgment in individual cases. But that is 
not necessarily bad because in all judgments there is always a big pragmatic dimen-
sion and we might as well concede it. That is the answer to the remark regarding 
universalism. 
Frankly right now I find more interesting the question about regionalism and 
conservatism. Much of the history of the past two or three hundred years has in-
volved the creation of larger and larger political and economic structures. There are 
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probably counter examples, but it is also probably indisputable· that it is itself inti-
mately related to the Enlightenment. So at least in this period there is a directional-
ity to human activities. Regionally, in addition to this bigger sphere there is also 
heightened mobility. Therefore a regional identification necessarily tends to be 
conservative as measured against the general trend of modernization. Again there 
can be counter examples. 
disClosure: I was just trying to think it through in the context of German unifi-
cation. Many people argue that the constitutional clause which was applied to East 
Germany unification had originally been written for the Alsace, and that each of the 
five states of the former GDR should have had its own referendum and autono-
mously requested (or refused) annexation to the larger union. So I am thinking too 
of the possibility that a state, say perhaps Thilringen, might have said that it did 
indeed want to join the West, but that would have been quite a different sort of 
process. 
Berman: The question I would have asked would be whether regional identifi-
cation, which can be both an expression of current local interest including com-
munity control and direct democracy, as well as possibly including a stronger tem-
poral dimension, will tend to be "the expression of those who have not yet moved 
away." This may, perhaps, be the source of greater counter-hegemonic potential 
than one would expect, which is to say that in this case maybe conservatism is more 
counter- hegemonic than progressivism. 
disClosure: I can certainly see that in the German case. 
Berman: We can talk about Germany of course, but I still want to challenge 
Cultural Studies; I think that conservatism is probably the genuine alterity to Cul-
tural Studies and the one alterity that it is afraid to touch. 
disClosure: An alterity that Cultural Studies is likely to represent as no alterior, 
but as the hegemonic center. I am interested in your critique of the Cultural Studies 
attack on the dominant actor by going out to the rest of the world and setting up the 
idea that perhaps it is the outside that is actually active, through the complex play of 
power, domination and hegemony, while the inside is inactive, hegemonic, and 
boring. You suggest that the inside also acts and there is a genuine interaction. 
When I read this claim in the introduction to Cultural Studies of Modern Germany, 
my first reaction was "Oh you can't say that, that is conservative." You are saying 
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the inside might affect something positively. I would like you to talk some more 
about the relations between "insides" and "outsides." 
Berman: I think that you put it quite well. The received opinion is that the 
margin, minority, the fragment-it is all a sort of romantic trope-is the interesting 
site as opposed to the hegemonic, stable, reified, ossified, morbid center. I wonder 
if that binary is not just a vestige of 18th century sentimentalism, and that in fact 
culture works much differently. In particular there is always an interaction between 
center and margin, between subversion and order, and that the possibility of culture, 
or of successful culture, might depend on a capacity for traditionalism. By tradi-
tionalism I mean a constant reference to the past in a non-reified way, that is to say a 
past which includes its reevaluation and restructuring. 
Traditionalism is denounced in a caricatured form as holding on desperately to a 
long dead canon, or pre-modem values. But maybe traditionalism transforms the 
past in passing it on. Maybe one way I can highlight the claim I am making is to 
suggest that in many of the theoretical statements around Cultural Studies, the insis-
tence on the non-essentialism of identity is made and instead identity is cast as rela-
tionship. What is meant is that the differences among various simultaneous actors is 
the frame of the terrain in which symbolic orders are played out, rather than, per-
haps, each actor having a clear and legible identity in isolation from what used to be 
called a "soul." 
Now, my critique of that is not to try to resurrect the soul, perish the thought, 
but to suggest that the model of relationality, derived as it is from certain structural-
ist accounts, suffers from the presentism of structuralism, what is often called the 
"anthropological present," and tends to obscure temporal connections. Identity is 
spatialized, and temporality comes up short. Within relationality then, I would want 
to include a temporal relationality as well, which includes therefore an involvement 
both with the past and with the future, and in fact, which recognizes that a capacity 
to engage with the future depends on a vital relationship with the past, hence tradi-
tionalism. The enforced amnesia of contemporary society, in which both Disney-
land and Cultural Studies presentism participate, effectively rob commumties of 
relations to their past, and therefore prohibits them from having any capacity to act 
teleologically toward an improved future. 
disClosure: I'd like to consider "amnesia" as you have just described it a bit 
more. A notion of "unification as forgetting" was set up in discussion around your 
lecture when you suggested that "we have to have amnesia in order to get out of this 
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business." In the c~ent-day Gennan context I think of Rambout and Gauck, who 
oversee dissemination of infonnation from the files of the East Gennan Secret po-
lice. I see at least three possiblities for these files. Many people say "let's just keep 
those files hidden". But there's also Benjamin's critique of Saint-Simonianism: we 
should not rebuild cities, because we need them there as a reminder of what's hap-
pened. That would suggest that the files should be preserved as a sobering monu-
ment or warning. The third alternative is the dead weight of history, what Benjamin 
calls historicism, which I think in the unification context would probably be the 
PDS (the old "Communist" party in East Gennany). I wonder if you could talk 
about how to operationalize Benjamin's analysis of materialist pedagogy when we 
think about unification in the 90s in Gennany. 
Berman: We were moving beyond the presentism of one-dimensional culture 
studies and we're beginning to recognize the importance of a relationship to the 
past, a productive and vital relationship to the past. Then we noticed Nietzsche with 
his distinction among various uses and abuses of history. Not any relation to the 
past is a good relation to the past, and there are some unfortunate relations to the 
past that are not merely forgetting, antiquarianism, a dead weight of the past, but 
that can debilitate. These may well be constitutive in any identity fonnation as the 
character to resist the forces of reunification. 
Now, the argument that I make with regard to Gennan unification is that the 40 
years of experience in the GDR are now being subsumed into a triumphalist history 
of West Gennany. And without in any way suggesting that the East Gennans' So-
cialism was a successful undertaking, I do note that there are 17 million people there 
who went through an awful lot, and are faced with a set of current discourses which 
imply an across-the-board devaluation of their biographies. They're being told that 
40 years of their lives don't count, that they were worthless and any defender of the 
worth of that experience (not the worth of the regime, but the worth of the experi-
ence) runs the risk of being subjected to police-state like leaks from the hidden 
documents. So the Stasi documents, evidence of massive collaboration, this dead 
weight of the past is held over the East Gennan population to assure its docility in 
the process of unification. The result will be alienation and resentment. 
The extraordinary success of the PDS is due not to Communist nostalgia, al-
though that's some component of it, or to any of the other excuses that are mounted 
for it. This is an expression of resentment against the universalist arrogance of West 
German political culture. In many ways, therefore, this situation is comparable to 
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resentment in the fonner Confederacy against the universalist arrogance of the Un-
ion after 1865. Hence the image I use of "carpet-bagging Wessies." 
disClosure: Which gets back to question of how do we balance those two? 
There's no easy fonnula. 
Berman: Right, there's no easy fonnula. I don't know. It may be that there is a 
way to theorize this, but it also may be a matter of examining particular cases. What 
would be the two possible options? One of them would be to say ''the universal 
nonns are valid and applied, but one should be extremely reluctant in imposing their 
application". There's a differenc~a big differenc~between critiquing the 
"ethnic cleansing" and intervening to stop the "ethnic cleansing." There's a differ-
ence between judgment and action. Or the other way to balance it is to understand 
that local memories are always going to become complex and diverse and that 
there's an obligation to side with the particular local memory closest to the univer-
salist aspirations. That second model would be the justification for the North's 
invasion of the South in the US Civil War, ifthe North had invaded the South to put 
an end to slavery. But of course that's a dubious claim. 
Western Cultural Hegemony and the Collapse of the Former Soviet Bloc 
disClosure: I would like to explore a point that I think in some ways speaks to 
the Western response to the collapse of the so-called Eastern bloc and relate it to 
some of the points we discussed a moment ago about Cultural Studies. There are 
those, among them Mary Louise Pratt and Stephan Greenblatt, who suggest that the 
Enlightenment experience of new lands and new peoples is not just a matter of try-
ing to cram these people and places into a flat topos, the taxonomy of Linnaeus, but 
also, at every moment, is a reflexive reconstitution of the Western self. I think 
Greenblatt makes this most clear in his book Marvelous Possessions. What that 
seems to imply is a kind of anxiety that's inherent in Western Enlightenment, and 
one almost gets the sense that this was the primary drive behind the Western re-
sponse to the collapse of Eastern Bloc: the colonization of Eastern European identi-
ties as "other", as pure lack/absense in comparison with presence of the triumphant 
West. That impulse seems to drive a complete devalorization of Eastern Bloc expe-
rience, as you've specifically mentioned vis a vis the fonner GDR 
Berman: I see those two movements at the beginning and at the end of the 
West, as so very different. In the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th centuri~ the West was 
attempting to draw the non-European lands into this sphere. After 1989, the West 
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was extremely confused by the collapse of the Soviet Empire, even today, has by no 
means come up with the anything like a coherent foreign policy. On the one hand, 
the applause for Gorbachev and his dismantling of Communism, seen as the ulti-
mate victory of capitalism, and the end of the Cold War; on the other hand, let us 
just review the glorious histories of the presidents of the "land of the free," from 
President Bush, in his Kiev speech, arguing against Ukrainian independence, his 
appalling apologies for the Gorbachev massacres, to president Clinton's memorable 
remark that the bombing of Grozny, Chechnya was an internal Russian affair, pre-
sumably in the same sense as the massacre in Waco was an internal American affair. 
Now, in these cases, there is an effort not to include Russia and its realm, but to 
exclude it. 
The same ambiguity applies in the Balkan War, which leads to this extraordi-
nary debilitation, and the same Faustian dividedness in soul, that is characteristic of 
the born-again Republicans with regard to foreign policy. For, if you think they're 
confused on domestic policy, I challenge you to tell me what their foreign policy 
would be. It can range from giving in to their long-standing anti-Russian hostilities 
and therefore deciding to bomb the Serbs, or giving in to their long-standing isola-
tionist sympathies, and telling the Bosnians to "go to Hell". And it's also a choice 
between the globalism of Dole and Bush or the isolationism of Buchanan. So I 
don't think there's a clear response on the part of the West. 
I've just spoken about the United States and Americans, but you're absolutely 
right that, as different as this is from the colonial model, the same kinds of funda-
mental issues are at stake. The specificity of the West and the assertion of the uni-
versal validity of these structures are at stake. If we looked at the colonial period 
more closely we would find similar splits. I know that in the history of German 
colonialism there was a lot of conservative opposition to colonialism, as I'm sure 
there was in England or France. Colonialism was a very weird undertaking, and it 
by no means represented what the whole nation or even the whole ruling class, if I 
may, wanted to do. That's another reason why a certain kind of post-colonial theory 
is amiss if it sees colonialism as the sole necessary outcome of Western Eurocen-
tricity, because there were surely many opponents of Western culture: including 
Germans, French, British, and Russians who didn't want to get involved in coloniz-
ing, for both progressive and conservative reasons. 
In many of these cases it's precisely the progressive elements who are for colo-
nialism because colonialism is seen as a modernizing impulse. Colonialism is just 
the prehistory of foreign aid. The old new left critique that foreign aid is part of 
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imperialism means that foreign aid is just the post World War II version of colonial-
ism. So then what is the Congressional Black Caucus up to when it wants to pre-
serve foreign aid? 
disClosure: With respect to the former Yugoslavia I can see clearly how we end 
up in this situation of "involved noninvolvement" as a result of these rather mixed, 
crossed motives. On the one hand we want to gauge our force, on the other hand we 
want to assuage our political consciences by emplacing an embargo, which in fact is 
a form of involvement. 
Berman: I don't think that the embargo's going to assuage anybody's con-
science. The act of the embargo is like the ban on selling arms to the Spanish Re-
publicans in the Spanish Civil War; a minimal step in the right direction would be 
lifting the embargo. 
I think that, looked at in any kind of sober way, the only way to preserve Yugo-
slavia would have been if the West had been prepared to introduce a massive influx 
of arms to keep it together. It's very difficult to find a compelling moral argument 
against Croatians living in independence, just as I think, by the way, that it's very 
difficult to find a compelling moral argument against Chechnian independence, 
except for the absolute priority of the right of Moskovites to cheap oil. If histori-
cally constituted peoples want to achieve a kind of national sovereignty, on what 
grounds do outsiders have a right to embargo against it? One could certainly force 
them back, but let's not pretend that this is a right. 
disClosure: What you've just articulated, I think, speaks back to your earlier 
comment about cultural universalism based on, as I understood what you were say-
ing, essentially an empathizing with other individuals, other peoples' desires to be 
distinct, and to articulate themselves with different spaces and times. 
Berman: What would happen if one of these peoples declared itself to be dis-
tinct, and decided to persecute an internal minority? At what point do other states, 
should other states, imagine intervening? In other words, put it to a test. It's a very 
interesting question, but let's not pretend that we've gotten very far on it. The only 
case where intervention has international legitimacy in order to protect minorities 
was the United Nations decision to limit Iraqi sovereignty with regard to its perse-
cution of the Kurds and the Shiites. Because of the potential ramifications for na-
tional sovereignty globally surely the United Nations is not going to do that to any 
of the members of the Security Council. 
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disClosure: And on that note, you sound very much like that part of Hork-
heimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment which castigates not Enlighten-
ment as such, but as I think they put it, Enlightenment which has relinquished the 
possibilities for its own realization. 
Berman: Enlightenment thought should engage the possibility for its own un-
realization through encounters with alterities in ways that do not segregate those 
alterities and assume their absolute incompatibility. 
disClosure: And by extension refuse to recognize one's own, the alterity of the 
"I" within that system, which I think is one of the components of, certainly 
Adorno's writings, and probably also Benjamin's, that Western scholars find most 
uncomfortable: their steadfast pushing of the implications theoretically and politi-
cally of the recognition of the alterior "I" itself. Perhaps that's the opposite moment 
of that colonizing aspect of Enlightenment. 
French Theory, German Theory, Cultural Theory 
disClosure: We've been talking about the Frankfurt School and dominance, but 
of course there's the poststructuralist argument for particularity. I want to build a 
bridge across the Rhine of theory. What kind of affinities and distinctions do you 
see between Poststructuralism and Critical Theory? 
Berman: I think that, in the culture war within the left (as opposed to the cul-
ture war between the left and the right) a lot of trivial comments are made about 
German theory/ French theory. Theory doesn't have a passport. "Theory doesn't 
need a passport" is what I'd like to say, because, as theory, it raises claims to uni-
versal validity. Otherwise it's not theory. The distinction is more specious given 
the clear indebtedness of the Structuralist and post-structuralist tradition to Heideg-
ger and Freud, those noted Frenchme~ and the strong internalization on the part of 
the German Enlightenment historically of Rousseau and other French thinkers. So 
to think about this as German thought or as French thought is initially wrong. And 
it's also subsequently wrong. Nevertheless, there will remain thinkers within Ger-
many and thinkers within France-to the extent that thinkers remain at all. 
I .think the issue is, in both cases, that theory entails statements which lay claim 
to umversal validity but which derive from particular experience. Then the question 
becomes: What is the particular experience and especially, imagined sheer particular 
experience in Germany and France. So I think the delightful surprise for Cultural 
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Studies is that in both cases the issue of national identity is sure to continue to con-
cern thinkers in those two countries in coming years both because of the extent of 
refugee movements and labor mobility but also because of the challenges facing the 
European Union. 
disClosure: What does the Frankfurt School offer us on this that post-
structuralists don't or can't? 
Berman: I think what the Frankfurt School and poststructuralism have in com-
mon has to do with the fragility and diversity of identity structures. In a sense, I 
suppose, that betrays homologous intellectual historical lineages. The Frankfurt 
School is a paratactic answer to the cohesive wholeness of Hegelian Marxism, 
Georg Lukac and of orthodox Marxism in general. Now, poststructuralism is a de-
centered alternative to the reified structures that bored French students to tears in 
the 1960s, so in a certain sense they're parallel, they're both moving toward more 
complex formulations. In both cases there's a particular historical reason. And one 
has to ask what can one get from each critique of reason, and what is incompatible 
with that critique of reason. I think one might begin with the discussion that in 
some poststructuralism, by no means all, there's a real emphatic theorization of 
gender issues for example, not very noticeable in the Frankfurt School, although 
that may be an expression of generational difference. 
disClosure: Well, including surely, even a critique of the possibility of theory 
itself, which is not often as manifest in poststructuralist thinking as, for example in 
the late works of Adorno, Minima Mora/ia in particular, and I guess in all the works 
of Benjamin. Which returns us, I think, to somewhere near where we began, in the 
sense that we not theorize just the appropriate mode of theorizing about cultures, 
which is very much one of the primary motivations of Cultural Studies as such, but 
a critique of theorizing as such and its relation to culture and politics, in which I 
think much more of the Adorno-Benjamin axis. 
Berman: Yes, I think that's a good distinction between the two tendencies. 
Poststructuralism, for all its anti-logocentricity, pretty much ends up politically 
correct and conformist, whereas Critical Theory is rarely politically correct and its 
theory is much more naturally politically incorrect because of its much more em-
phatic doubts about the substance of progressivism. I think there are strong elitist 
and hegemonic moments within poststructuralism, I think to the extent that it has 
involved a multiplicity of language games and therefore gives up universality, it 
strips away any possibility of an effective and consistent critique say, of the, dis-
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mantling of the redistributative mechanisms of the welfare state. But despite that 
conformist banter, despite that moment in poststructuralism, it exists in the academy 
in a strange hybridization with the progressivist sympathies of many of its propo-
nents. That is, poststructuralists tend to be liberals despite the labile connection 
between progressivism in politics and the theoretical resistance to any narrative of 
progress. In contrast, the Frankfurt School raises grand doubts about the substance 
of any particularly positive progressivism while at the same time, in the background, 
there is an aspiration to ultimate emancipation. So it stands the poststructuralist 
situation on its head. 
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